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Reducing the Overburden: The Doris Coal 
Presumption and Administrative Efficiency 
Under the Black Lung Benefits Act 
Eric R. Olson 
Coal dust build-up prevents many coal miners' lungs from func­
tioning properly.1 This condition, commonly referred to as black lung 
or pneumoconiosis, can make common activities nearly impossible.2 
The Black Lung Benefits Act covers the cost of medical treatment for 
many affected miners, though procedural impediments often prevent 
miners from receiving care. The miner's current or former employer, 
when identifiable, must pay for medical care relating to the miner's 
black lung. Most disputes over miners' claims for medical care arise 
when the miner has a history of cigarette smoking and the need for 
medical care could arise from either coal dust or tobacco smoke be­
cause both substances affect the same body systems. Coal companies 
prefer not to pay for medical care arising from cigarettes, while miners 
do not want their smoking history to prevent coverage of treatment 
for their occupational disease, especially when causation has not been 
clearly established. To receive payment for care, miners must prove to 
the Department of Labor through an often lengthy administrative 
process that the medical treatment met the eligibility requirements. 
Specifically, miners must assemble both medical documentation de­
scribing the treatment and the justification for the treatment in order 
to prevail in the administrative hearing. 
The current black lung program traces its origin through four ma­
jor congressional actions. The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety 
Act of 1969 ("1969 Act") arose out of frustration with state programs 
to protect miners and adequately care for those with occupational dis­
eases. The 1969 Act represented the first of many comprehensive leg­
islative efforts to improve the well-being of coal miners. In addition to 
establishing safety standards and authorizing enforcement mecha­
nisms, the 1969 Act provided a "limited response in the form of emer­
gency assistance" through monthly stipends to miners who suffer from 
1. Michael D. Attfield & Gregory R. Wagner, Respiratory Disease in Coal Miners, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 413, 413 (William N. Rom ed., 3d ed. 
1998). 
2. Black lung describes many distinct diseases arising from prolonged coal dust expo­
sure, though most attention is focused on coal workers pneumoconiosis (CWP). CWP is a 
disease characterized by the buildup of nodules of coal in the lungs that progressively de­
creases the ability of the lungs to function. See id. 
696 
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pneumoconiosis.3 This "limited response" has taken on a life of its 
own over the past thirty years through four subsequent acts and re­
lated regulations greatly extending the black lung benefits program. 
Courts further complicated this already complex system, often leaving 
miners' ability to receive benefits highly dependent on the circuit in 
which they brought their claim. 
The 1969 Act created four statutory presumptions to remove some 
of the impediments facing miners as they sought disability payments.4 
Because many eligible miners still did not receive benefits, Congress 
passed the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 ("1972 Act").5 The 1972 
Act, among other things, covered medical benefits for treating pneu­
moconiosis in eligible miners. The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 
1977 further expanded the umbrella of eligibility.6 The Black Lung 
Benefits Amendments of 1981 dramatically scaled back the effects of 
the Acts in response to the increasing cost of the benefits program to 
the government and industry by removing many of the statutory pre­
sumptions and increasing the ability of coal companies to contest the 
miners' allegations.7 These reductions in the Act,8 however, did not 
undermine its central commitment to providing care for eligible min­
ers. Rather, the changes limited eligibility requirements by limiting the 
class of miners able to receive care and removing some of the statu­
tory presumptions aiding miners seeking to establish total disability 
due to pneumoconiosis.9 
Neither the Act nor the relevant regulations thoroughly describe 
the required causal nexus between the miner's pneumoconiosis and 
eligibility for medical benefits. The Fourth Circuit, in Doris Coal v. 
Director,10 lowered the administrative barrier facing miners by 
switching the burden of production fat eligible miners who seek cov-
3. H.R. REP. No. 91-563, at 13.1 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2503. 
4. 30 U.S.C. § 921 (1994); see also Robert L. Ramsey & Robert S. Habermann, The Fed­
eral Black Lung Program - The View from the Top, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 575, 576-77 (1985). 
5. S. REP. No. 92-743 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2305, 2307 (stating that the 
rate of denial "suggests strongly that the solution has not been nearly as complete as Con­
gress believed and expected it would be"). 
6. Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978). 
7. Many economic and political forces led to the reduction of the benefits program. The 
Black Lung Disability Trust Fund ran an estimated deficit of $552 million in 1981 and had a 
cumulative deficit of approximately $1.5 billion. See H.R. REP. No. 97-406, at 13.1 (1981), 
reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2671, 2680. The balance of power in the White House and 
Congress also weakened proponents of the benefits program. 
8. "The Act" refers to the currently applicable federal black lung benefits program, 
most recently altered by the 1981 amendments discussed supra note 7 and accompanying 
text. 
9. See Ramsey & Habermann, supra note 4, at 597 (stating that "[t]he major effect of the 
1981 amendments . . .  has been to return to the evidentiary format set forth in the original 
program"). 
10. 938 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1991). 
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erage for pulmonary care. The Doris Coal court held that "when a 
miner receives treatment for a pulmonary disorder, a presumption 
arises that the disorder was caused or at least aggravated by the 
miner's pneumoconiosis."11 This reduction in the burden faced by 
miners in the administrative process makes it easier for eligible miners 
to receive coverage for medical care. The Department of Labor has 
proposed regulations that expressly adopt the Doris Coal presumption 
to aid miners as they seek coverage for eligible treatment.12 The Sixth 
Circuit recently disagreed with the Fourth Circuit, holding the Doris 
Coal presumption invalid and requiring the coal miner seeking cover­
age for medical treatment to produce evidence demonstrating the 
connection.13 This Note argues that the Fourth Circuit's judicial pre­
sumption is constitutionally and statutorily permissible and effectively 
implements the remedial objectives of the Black Lung Benefits Act. 
To receive benefits under the Act, miners must first prove that 
they are "totally disabled" due to pneumoconiosis arising at least in 
part out of coal mine employment.14 Miners begin the benefit process 
by applying for benefits at their Social Security office, and their appli­
cation is then forwarded to the Department of Labor.15 Successful 
claimants receive a monthly benefit check and are eligible for cover­
age of medical care for their "pneumoconiosis and ancillary pulmo­
nary conditions. "1 6 These two steps are commonly called stage one, 
applying for the monthly check, and stage two, applying for the medi­
cal benefits.17 Only once a miner has passed stage one can she seek 
coverage for the medical benefits under stage two. The Act and ac­
companying regulations define "total disability" as a legal term of art 
that includes more miners than those totally disabled in fact by pneu­
moconiosis.1 8 Miners may receive certain presumptions of total dis­
ability based on medical evidence and mining history. Miners who pre-
11. Id. at 496. 
12. See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966, 55,060 (1999) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 725.701(e)) (proposed 
Oct. 8, 1999). In the discussion of the proposed rule, the Department of Labor "propose(s) a 
regulatory presumption, based on the Fourth Circuit's approach, that would apply nation­
wide." Id. at 54,970. 
13. Glen Coal Co. v. Seals, 147 F.3d 502, 514 (6th Cir. 1998). The Fourth Circuit consid­
ered Glen Coal in Gulf & Western Industries v. Ling, 176 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1999), and reaf­
firmed the Doris Coal presumption. 
14. Tussey v. Island Creek Coal Co., 982 F.2d 1036, 1039 (6th Cir. 1993). 
15. See Ramsey & Habermann, supra note 4, at 583-84. 
16. 20 C.F.R. § 725.701 (2000). 
17. See Glen Coal, 147 F.3d at 512 ("The Doris Coal presumption states that if a miner 
proves his entitlement to benefits in stage one, the miner is entitled to a presumption in 
stage two that the medical bills he presents are related to his pneumoconiosis."). 
18. See John S. Lopatto III, The Federal Black Lung Program: A 1983 Primer, 85 W. 
VA. L. REV. 677 (1983). 
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sent X-ray evidence of nodules of coal dust in their lung demonstrat­
ing complicated pneumoconiosis, also known as progressive massive 
fibrosis, receive an irrebuttable presumption of total disability.19 In 
addition, miners who are diagnosed by other means receive the same 
irrebuttable presumption if the diagnosis shows a condition that could 
reasonably be expected to yield evidence of complicated pneumoco­
niosis.20 Miners who filed a claim before 1982 received a rebuttable 
presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis if: (1) they 
mined for at least fifteen years, (2) their chest X-ray was interpreted 
negatively, and (3) they proffered other evidence that demonstrated 
the existence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impair­
ment.21 A miner who does not meet the requirements of the relevant 
presumptions can also meet the total disability requirement by dem­
onstrating that "pneumoconiosis prevents him or her from engaging in 
gainful employment requiring the skills and abilities comparable to 
those of any employment in a mine or mines in which he or she previ­
ously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of 
time."22 The Doris Coal presumption only applies to those miners who 
have passed the eligibility requirements of stage one by proving total 
disability due to pneumoconiosis. 
The Act requires the miner's former employer, when identifiable, 
to pay for eligible medical treatment. If the employer seeks to contest 
eligibility, the dispute enters an administrative hearing. The Doris 
Coal presumption transfers the burden of production from the miner 
to the contesting former employer. The burden of production, half of 
the burden often referred to as the burden of proof, is the responsibil­
ity of producing enough evidence to raise a claim.23 The Doris Coal 
presumption does not alter the burden of persuasion, and the miner 
retains ultimate responsibility for persuading the tribunal that the 
medical care met the Act's eligibility requirements. By transferring the 
production requirement, however, the Doris Coal presumption greatly 
eases the procedural burden on miners who seek coverage for pulmo­
nary care and will result in more coverage for eligible care. Miners no 
longer need to produce extensive documentation to receive coverage 
for routine care and, because of this reduced hassle, will more likely 
seek treatment for their pulmonary ailments. 
19. 20 C.F.R. § 718.304(a) (2000). 
20. 20 C.F.R. § 718.304(c) (2000). 
21. 20 C.F.R. § 718.305 (2000). Such dated cases are not, unfortunately, merely of his­
toric interest. Noah Stiltner, the Doris Coal claimant, originally filed his claim in 1979. Doris 
Coal, 938 F.2d at 492, 494 (4th Cir. 1991). 
22. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(l)(A) (1994). 
23. See JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 992 (1997); see also Lovilia Coal Co. 
v. Harvey, 109 F.3d 445, 452 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing differences between burden of pro­
duction and burden of persuasion under the Act). 
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This Note argues that courts should adopt the Doris Coal pre­
sumption created by the Fourth Circuit. Part I demonstrates that the 
Black Lung Benefits Act, the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 
and the Constitution permit the Doris Coal presumption. Part II ar­
gues that the Doris Coal presumption best fulfills the remedial intent 
of the Act and results in more efficient administration of the Act. This 
Note concludes that courts should follow the Doris Coal presumption 
and transfer the burden of production in medical benefit disputes re­
garding pulmonary care for covered miners. 
I. THE DORIS COAL PRESUMPTION IS PERMITTED 
The Doris Coal presumption, like other statutory and regulatory 
presumptions, helps to further the purpose of the Act. This Part dem­
onstrates that the Act, the APA, and relevant judicial precedent per­
mit the Doris Coal presumption. Section I.A demonstrates that the 
Act does not limit presumptions to those identified only within the 
Act itself. Section l.B examines judicial review of other presumptions 
under the Act and concludes that the Doris Coal presumption would 
survive scrutiny under every court's approach to examining extra­
statutory presumptions under the Act. Section LC argues that the ju­
dicial origin of the Doris Coal presumption does not violate the APA 
or the Supreme Court's command of judicial deference to administra­
tive procedure. Since neither the Act nor other applicable law pre­
vents the creation of the Doris Coal presumption, the presumption is 
permissible. 
A. Other Presumptions Prohibited 
To ease the burden on miners seeking benefits under the Act, 
Congress established several statutory presumptions.24 The 
Department of Labor, the administrative agency charged with over­
sight of the black lung benefits program, created other presumptions 
aiding miners in their applications for benefits.25 While the Act and ac­
companying regulations establish certain presumptions, neither the 
Act nor the regulations expressly prohibit the creation of additional 
presumptions aiding a miner in proving her claim. 
24. See Director v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 280 (1994) (recognizing that "[i]n 
part due to Congress's recognition that claims such as those involved here would be difficult 
to prove, claimants in adjudications under these statutes benefit from certain statutory pre­
sumptions easing their burden"); 30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1994); see also supra notes 19-22 and 
accompanying text. 
25. 30 C.F.R. § 718.301-06 (2000); 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a) (2000). 
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The Act does not limit presumptions to those contained in the 
statute itself or regulations.26 Furthermore, the Doris Coal presump­
tion does not override any aspect of the Act or accompanying regula­
tions. The regulations only address the provision of medical benefits 
briefly, stating that the miner shall receive medical treatment "for such 
periods as the nature of the miner's pneumoconiosis and ancillary 
pulmonary conditions and disability require."27 When a dispute arises 
over medical benefits, the regulations order the district director28 to 
"informally resolve such dispute. "29 If the parties do not reach an in­
formal resolution, the regulations command the district director to re­
fer the case to an Administrative Law Judge.30 The Doris Coal pre­
sumption does not contravene any part of the Act or regulations 
because neither Congress nor the Department of Labor has identified 
specific procedural rules to govern the procedure used by the district 
director or the Administrative Law Judge. 
The Department of Labor has proposed new regulations that ex­
pressly adopt the Doris Coal presumption by adding another clause to 
the medical benefits section creating a rebuttable presumption that a 
pulmonary disorder in the miner is caused or aggravated by the 
miner's pneumoconiosis.31 The proposed regulation expands the 
regulations and, by implication, demonstrates that the Doris Coal pre­
sumption does not contradict the Act or current regulations. In other 
words, the proposed regulations only add, in relevant part, an addi­
tional subsection to section 725.701, leaving the existing four subsec­
tions unchanged. By adding to the current regulations rather than 
changing the existing language, the proposed regulations demonstrate 
that the Doris Coal presumption supplements, rather than contra­
venes, the current regulatory scheme. 
B. Judicial Review of Other Extrastatutory Presumptions 
Changes to the administrative process that shift the burden of per­
suasion violate the AP A, while alterations that move the burden of 
26. See Lovilia Coal, 109 F.3d at 451; see also infra Section II.A, discussing Congress's 
statement that the statutory presumptions were not meant to be exclusive. 
27. 20 C.F.R. § 725.701(b) (2000). 
28. A district director is a claims administrator who is charged with specific duties under 
the Act. 20 C.F.R. § 725.lOl(a)(ll) (2000). 
29. 20 C.F.R. § 725.707(a) (2000). 
30. 20 C.F.R. § 725.707(b) (2000) (stating that "such hearing shall be scheduled at the 
earliest possible time and shall take precedence over all other requests for hearing"). 
31. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 64 
Fed. Reg. 54,966, 55,060 (1999) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 725.701(e)) (proposed Oct. 8, 
1999) ("If a miner receives a medical service or supply, as described in this section, for any 
pulmonary disorder, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the disorder is caused or 
aggravated by the miner's pneumoconiosis."). 
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production do not. The Supreme Court in Greenwich Collieries ex­
amined the Department of Labor's "true doubt rule," a rule that en­
abled the claimant to collect benefits when the evidence is "equally 
balanced."32 The Court held that, under the APA, such a rule imper­
missibly changed the burden of persuasion and that agencies are not 
free to decide who shall bear the burden of persuasion in proceedings 
carried out under the AP A.33 In so doing, the Court recognized the 
appropriateness of other statutory and regulatory presumptions that 
ease or shift the burdens of production placed on the miner.34 The 
"true doubt rule," however, attempted to "go one step further."35 
Consistent with most other judicial and administrative proceed­
ings, the Act places the burdens of both production and persuasion on 
the claimant during the initial application for benefits. The Doris Coal 
presumption intervenes to shift the burden of production only after 
the miner has established total disability and sought medical benefits. 
Under the Doris Coal presumption, the miner retains the burden of 
persuasion at all times. Even the Sixth Circuit, when it declined to 
adopt the Doris Coal presumption, expressly held that since the Doris 
Coal presumption "merely reallocates the burden of production, and 
does not affect the burden of proof,"36 it does not violate the APA or 
Supreme Court precedent.37 Because the Doris Coal presumption, un­
like the presumption at issue in Greenwich Collieries, only alters the 
burden of production, it does not contravene the Court's holding. 
The Eighth Circuit in Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey, the only other 
court to examine presumptions for black lung claimants under 
Greenwich Collieries, held presumptions that reallocated the burden 
of production but not the burden of persuasion valid.38 In Lovilia, the 
Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs urged the 
court to adopt the Director's "one element standard," a standard ena­
bling a previously denied miner to reopen his claim for benefits upon a 
showing that "one element" of his condition has changed.39 The court 
32. Director v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 269 (1994). 
33. Id. at 280-81 (holding that the APA was designed to introduce "uniformity of proce­
dure and standardization of administrative practice" and that allowing agencies to alter bur­
den of persuasion defeats that purpose). 
34. Id. at 280 ("(I]n part due to Congress's recognition that claims such as those in­
volved here would be difficult to prove, claimants in adjudications under these statutes bene­
fit from certain statutory presumptions easing their burden. Similarly, the Department's so­
licitude for benefits claimants is reflected in the regulations adopting additional 
presumptions." (citations omitted)). 
35. Id. 
36. Glen Coal Co. v. Seals, 147 F.3d 502, 512 (6th Cir. 1998). 
37. Id. at 513 (holding "the Doris Coal presumption withstands scrutiny under 
Greenwich Collieries," but invalidating on inconsistency with Sixth Circuit law). 
38. Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey, 109 F.3d 445, 452 (8th Cir. 1997). 
39. Id. at 451. 
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held that the Director's interpretation created a presumption, but 
equated the presumption to "the statutory and regulatory presump­
tions which ease a black lung claimant's burden of production, but do 
not shift the burden of persuasion, as that term is used in Greenwich 
Collieries."40 The court then held the presumption created by the "one 
element standard" valid.41 The Doris Coal presumption more closely 
resembles the burden of production shifting character of the "one 
element standard" than the burden of persuasion change at issue in 
Greenwich Collieries because it only alters who must produce the evi­
dence and leaves in place the obligation to persuade the tribunal. 
C. Judicial Origin of Presumption 
The Doris Coal presumption differs from all other presumptions 
related to the Act because it arose in the courts, rather than in the 
Department of Labor or Congress. At first blush, such an origin would 
seem to conflict with the Supreme Court's clear mandate that courts 
"are not free to impose upon agencies specific procedural require­
ments that have no basis in the APA."42 The Doris Coal presumption, 
however, differs significantly from the type of procedural require­
ments imposed upon agencies that the Court has struck down. Doris 
Coal does not relate to rulemaking,43 impose additional requirements 
on the agency or the adjudicative process,44 or alter the substantive 
rights of parties before the agency.45 Rather, the Doris Coal presump­
tion merely changes the burden of production at one step of the ad­
ministrative process with regard to individual claimants who have al­
ready met the procedural requirements and proved their eligibility 
under the program. 
In Vermont Yankee, the most definitive statement on the interplay 
between courts and agencies in determining proper administrative 
procedures, the Court relied on two prior Federal Communications 
40. Id. at 452-53. 
41. Id. 
42. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990) (summarizing 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 
(1978)). 
43. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524 (holding that the APA "established the maxi­
mum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon 
agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures" (citing United States v. Florida East Coast 
Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 
(1972))). 
44. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524 (stating that courts are "generally not free to 
impose" additional procedural rights on the agency). The Doris Coal presumption does not 
create or impose additional procedural rights, rather it transfers one obligation - the bur­
den of production - from the miner to the coal company contesting payment. 
45. See Director v. Greenwich Collieries, 527 U.S. 267, 271 (1994) (discussing the prohi­
bition against altering the substantive rights of parties before the agency under the Act). 
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Commission (FCC) decisions to hold that the development of proce­
dures should be left to the discretion of the agencies.46 Those prior de­
cisions emphasized the congressional determination that the agencies 
have more familiarity with the industry and problems presented by the 
regulations and are therefore better positioned to create effective pro­
cedures.47 In Vermont Yankee, the Court overturned the D.C. Circuit's 
invalidation of orders of the Atomic Energy Commission by requiring 
the agency to include additional information-gathering procedures. In 
the two FCC decisions relied on by Vermont Yankee, the lower courts 
had ordered the agency to redecide, in essence, a prior decision utiliz­
ing different procedural rules.48 The Court reversed both times. 
The Court's strong statements against judicial imposition of addi­
tional procedural requirements might seem to include the Doris Coal 
presumption within its broad ban. Such a claim, however, fails to rec­
ognize the distinction between imposing additional procedural re­
quirements on the agency and altering procedural requirements of 
parties before the agency. Unlike the judicial intervention at issue in 
Vermont Yankee and related cases, the Doris Coal presumption does 
not force new or additional procedures on the agency. Rather, the pre­
sumption just shifts the burden of production from one party to the 
other, leaving the entire administrative procedure intact. Eligible min­
ers who seek coverage for medical bills still must persuade the same 
Administrative Law Judge through the same procedural process as 
they would without the presumption. 
In addition, the Doris Coal presumption meets the standards for 
agency-created presumptions. Presumptions "must rest on a sound 
factual connection between the proved and inferred facts."49 As dem­
onstrated in Part II infra, the Doris Coal presumption arises out of 
clear, established medical facts. In addition, the Doris Coal presump­
tion does not alter the substantive rights or obligations of the parties. 
Because the Doris Coal presumption only affects the burden of pro­
duction, and not the burden of persuasion, the potential harm created 
is significantly less than in situations where the presumption changes 
46. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524. 
47. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 289 (1965). 
48. In Schreiber, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court's ruling that certain docu­
ments subpoenaed by the FCC should be held confidential. The Supreme Court rejected 
such a procedural requirement, holding that "in providing for judicial review of administra­
tive procedural rule-making, Congress has not empowered district courts to substitute their 
judgment for that of an agency." Id. at 290-91. In FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., the 
D.C. Circuit ordered the FCC to set aside permits issued using a comparative-basis proce­
dure and repeat the process using an independent procedure. The Court reversed, on the 
grounds that the "subordinate questions of procedure" were left to the FCC. 309 U.S. 134, 
138 (1940). 
49. NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc, 442 U.S. 773, 787 (1979); see also Mobile, Jackson & 
Kansas City R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910). 
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the underlying burden of persuasion. The miner still must persuade 
the Administrative Law Judge that her medical care relates to her 
pneumoconiosis. 
The language of the Act, the tenor of the regulations, and the 
Supreme Court's express examination of presumptions under the Act 
demonstrate the appropriateness of the Doris Coal presumption. The 
Department of Labor's proposed regulations expressly adopting the 
Doris Coal presumption further show that the presumption does not 
overlap with or change the current Act or regulations. In the current 
regulatory silence, the Doris Coal presumption does not override the 
agency's ability to interpret or administer the Act. 
II. THE DORIS COAL PRESUMPTION IS THE BEST APPROACH 
This Part argues that the Doris Coal presumption furthers 
Congress's intent and promotes efficiency and consistency. Section 
II.A demonstrates that the remedial nature of the Act supports the 
Doris Coal presumption. Section 11.B argues that the Doris Coal pre­
sumption produces more efficient administration of the Act. Section 
11.C contends that the presumption results in a consistent and fair ap­
plication of the Act. These benefits flowing from the Doris Coal pre­
sumption help reduce administrative costs and increase the number of 
eligible miners receiving their allotted coverage. 
A. Remedial Nature of the Act 
This Section demonstrates that the Doris Coal presumption fur­
thers Congress's remedial goal. First, this Section addresses the con­
text from which the original Act arose. This Section next examines the 
meaning of "remedial" within the statute. Third, this Section shows 
that the legislative history supports a broad interpretation of the Act 
that gives effect to its remedial nature. Finally, this Section examines 
the Department of Labor regulations and judicial implementation of 
the Act and finds that the Doris Coal presumption aids this remedial 
goal. 
The 1969 Act emerged from an environment in which coal miners 
faced many problems when they sought aid under state workers' com­
pensation programs for their occupational diseases.50 The 1969 Act 
sought to remedy these failures of the state workers' compensation 
50. 30 U.S.C. § 901(a) (1994) (stating that "few States provide benefits for death or dis­
ability due to [pneumoconiosis] to coal miners"); H.R. REP. No. 91-563, at 13 (1969), re­
printed in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2503, 2516 (describing "the failure of the States to assume 
compensation responsibilities for the miners covered by this program"). 
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programs, and this remedial purpose continues today. s1 The Act 
authorizes approved state programs to administer black lung benefits 
programs; however, the Department of Labor has yet to approve any 
state workers' compensation program. s2 Thus, the black lung benefits 
program continues to provide the main remedy for coal miners af­
flicted with pneumoconiosis. s3 
Congress's characterization of the Act as remedial signifies that it 
sought to fix the failure of state workers' compensation systems to 
provide adequately for the needs of coal miners with pneumoconiosis. 
Congress explicitly stated the problem that it sought to remedy with 
the Act - "Congress finds . . .  that few states provide benefits for 
death or disability due to [pneumoconiosis]." s4 Traditional state sys­
tems did not adequately cover coal miners because of the severe proof 
problems facing miners seeking coverage for occupational disease. ss 
Occupational disease arises over a long period, often exceeding the 
relevant statute of limitations, and frequently cannot be traced to a 
specific employer or time of exposure. s6 Congress expressly stated its 
intention "that the act be construed liberally when improved health or 
safety to miners will result." s7 
The 1969 Act did not meet the expectations of many of its sup­
porters, leading to the passage of the 1972 Act. s8 The Senate Report to 
the 1972 Act again clearly expressed its remedial intent: 
The Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 is intended to be a remedial Jaw -
to improve upon the 1969 provisions so that the cases which should be 
51. 30 U.S.C. § 901(a) (stating "that few States provide benefits for death or disability 
due to this disease to coal miners" and that "the purpose of this subchapter [is] to provide 
benefits" to miners). 
52. See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, 62 Fed. Reg. 3337, 3347 (proposed Jan. 22, 1997) (stating "[t]o date, no state law has 
been approved" under the Act). 
53. 20 C.F.R. § 722.152 (2000) (stating that the secretary has not identified any state that 
"provides adequate coverage for pneumoconiosis"). A few miners qualify for state workers' 
compensation benefits, but the federal program provides the only coverage in the country 
that is geared towards the occupational disease of coal miners. 
54. 30 U.S.C. § 901(a). 
55. Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916, 921-25 
(1980). 
56. See W. Kip Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim 
Compensation and Risk Regulation, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 66-68 (1984); Compensating Vic­
tims of Occupational Disease, supra note 55, at 921-27. 
57. H.R. REP. No. 91-761, at 63 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A. N. 2578, 2578. The 
committee continues, "it is the purpose of this title to provide such benefits and to insure 
that future adequate benefits are provided to coal miners . . .  where disability or death oc­
curs from [pneumoconiosis]." 1969 U.S.C.C.A. N. at 2603. 
58. S. REP. No. 92-743, at 1 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A. N. 2305, 2305 (stating 
"[t]he Committee fully intends and expects that [the 1972 Act] will more adequately meet 
the objectives originally sought in [the 1969 Act]"). 
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compensated, will be compensated. In the absence of definitive medical 
conclusions there is a clear need to resolve doubts in favor of the disabled 
miner or his survivors.59 
Congress recognized that many miners faced procedural hurdles that 
prevented compensation, especially due to disputes over the exact na­
ture of the miner's pulmonary impairment. 60 The 1977 Act also im­
plemented changes that were "remedial in nature" by adding an addi­
tional presumption facilitating the collection of benefits by miners who 
had worked in the mines for many years.61 
The Department of Labor and courts have recognized the broad 
remedial purposes of the statute and have applied its benefits provi­
sions generously. 62 In addition, many courts expressly recognize the 
remedial and compensatory purpose of the Act and hold that they 
should thus construe the provisions liberally.63 These holdings make 
sense given Congress's meaning of remedial: if the Act seeks to rem­
edy overly restrictive denials of benefits, the cure should be more lib­
eral standards for benefits. 
The language of the statute reflects this remedial approach in its 
use of presumptions. Recognizing that many miners would have diffi­
culty establishing entitlement to the benefits offered by the Act, Con­
gress created several statutory presumptions to ease the miners' evi­
dentiary requirements.6 4 Congress created the presumptions to reflect 
their belief that there was a strong statistical likelihood that miners 
meeting the requirements of the presumption would also meet the re­
quired elements of total disability but for the difficulty of establishing 
definitive medical evidence.65 From a policy perspective, the presump-
59. S. REP. NO. 92-743 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2305, 2315 (emphasis 
added). 
60. See, for example, statement by Senator Robert C. Byrd: "Let us stop quibbling with 
dying men as to whether their lungs are riddled with black lung or whether they are affected 
with asthma, or silicosis, or chronic bronchitis." Id. at 2314. 
61. H. REP. NO. 95-151, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 37, 240. 
62. 20 C.F.R. § 718.3(c) (2000) ("Congress intended that claimants be given the benefit 
of all reasonable doubt as to the existence of total or partial disability or death due to pneu­
moconiosis."). 
63. See, e.g., Sharondale Corp. v. Ross, 42 F.3d 993, 996 (6th Cir. 1994); Wiley v. Con­
"' solidation Coal Co., 892 F.2d 498, 503 (6th Cir. 1989); Rose v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 614 F.2d 
936, 939 (4th Cir. 1980); Wheatley v. Adler, 407 F.2d 307, 313-14 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
64. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22. 
65. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 92-743 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2305, 2317 
(quoting testimony by the Surgeon General regarding the fifteen-year presumption that 
"[f]or work periods greater than 15 years underground, there was a linear increase in the 
prevalence of the disease"). The state of the medical knowledge at the time of the Acts dif­
fers from current knowledge. See Mark E. Solomons, A Critical Analysis of the Legislative 
History Surrounding the Black Lung Interim Presumption and a Survey of Its Unresolved 
Issues, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 869 (1981). The relevant set of knowledge needed to analyze the 
intent of Congress, however, is the set of knowledge reflecting medical wisdom at the time 
that Congress passed the Acts. 
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tions serve to approximate the occurrence of total disability due to 
pneumoconiosis while resolving uncertain cases in the miners' favor. 
These statutory presumptions operate during the adjudication of the 
benefit application. 
Since the statute expressly authorizes the Department of Labor to 
create other presumptions as part of the implementing regulations, the 
absence of the Doris Coal presumption from the statutory scheme 
does not preclude its later creation. Congress, by delegating much of 
the regulatory scheme, did not purport to create a definitive list of 
presumptions in the statute. As discussed supra, the Act represented a 
rare entry into the field of workers' compensation that Congress gen­
erally leaves to the states. Congress's unfamiliarity in administering 
such occupational protection programs counsels against giving great 
weight to any omission. 
The Doris Coal presumption operates in a similar manner to the 
statutory presumptions, but during the second stage of the benefit ap­
plication process. Observing that most pulmonary care provided to 
miners who have established total disability due to pneumoconiosis 
will relate to their pneumoconiosis, the Doris Coal court created an 
evidentiary presumption that best reflected that relationship.66 Of 
course, the pulmonary care will not always relate to the miner's 
pneumoconiosis, so the presumption is rebuttable.67 The rebuttable 
nature of the presumption also balances concerns that the remedial 
nature of the Act does not improperly enlarge the Act beyond its leg­
islative mandate. If the remedial nature of the Act has justified expan­
sive coverage with regard to the stage one monthly pension, courts 
should apply similarly expansive standards for medical benefits.68 That 
such an approach results in an overbroad pool of eligible miners can­
not be used to criticize the awards, as the very point of the Act was to 
err on the side of overinclusion, not underinclusion.69 
66. The court expressly linked the observation that "most pulmonary disorders are go­
ing to be related or at least aggravated by the presence of pneumoconiosis" to the burden of 
production shifting presumption that in such cases, "the disorder was caused or at least ag­
gravated by the miner's pneumoconiosis." Doris Coal v. Director, 938 F.2d 492, 492, 496 (4th 
Cir. 1991). 
67. While the Doris Coal court does not use the word rebuttable, their description of the 
presumption coupled with judicial and agency interpretation clearly establish its rebuttable 
nature. See Island Creek Coal Co. v. Director, No. 95-2244, 1996 WL 405222, at *1 (4th Cir. 
July 19, 1996) (finding evidence presented "insufficient as a matter of law to establish rebut­
tal."); Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 64 
Fed. Reg. 54,966, 55,003 (proposed Oct. 8, 1999) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 725.701) (cre­
ating a "rebuttable presumption"). 
68. See, e.g., Robbins v. Cyprus Cumberland Coal Co., 146 F.3d 425, 427 (6th Cir. 1998). 
69. Although the 1981 Amendments limited the eligibility requirements for the Act, 
they did not alter the overinclusive definition of pneumoconiosis. The 1981 Amendments 
limited eligibility in other ways, such as by removing presumptions based purely on amount 
of time spent working as a miner. Because the definition of pneumoconiosis remained un­
changed, this overinclusive intent survived the 1981 Amendments. 
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The Sixth Circuit in Glen Coal based its holding on the claim that 
by not establishing any statutory presumptions in the medical benefits 
phase of the Act, Congress "intended for there to be no such presump­
tion. "70 This assertion improperly imputes intent from congressional 
inaction71 and fails to recognize the manner in which the medical bene­
fits portion of the Act arose. Entitlement to medical benefits for eligi­
ble miners did not arise until the 1972 Act when Congress merely im­
ported the current medical benefits structure of the Longshore and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA).72 Rather than create 
a separate process and associated presumptions for medical benefits, 
Congress adopted wholesale a preexisting statutory and regulatory 
framework created primarily for the compensation of occupational 
injury rather than occupational disease.73 This failure to address the 
difference between injury and disease calls into question the Sixth Cir­
cuit's assertion that Congress had a clear intent about presumptions 
on this issue at all. Indeed, the LHWCA contains statutory presump­
tions inapplicable to occupational disease such as presumptions that 
the injury was not caused "solely by the intoxication of the injured 
employee" or by "the willful intention of the injured employee to in­
jure or kill himself."74 
Furthermore, failing to create a presumption effectively leaves the 
medical benefits sections as a traditional workers' compensation pro­
gram like those run by the states plagued by the same tendency to un­
dercompensate occupational disease because of the procedural hur­
dles faced by potential claimants. At the time that Congress added the 
medical benefits provision of the Act, however, it was well aware of 
the different success rates of compensation programs with regard to 
injury and disease.75 Given that the creation of the whole black lung 
benefits program arose in part because of the failure of state workers' 
compensation systems to compensate adequately those afflicted with 
the occupational diseases of coal mining, imputing to Congress an in­
tent to adopt a workers' compensation system to govern medical bene­
fits seems problematic. At most, Congress's express statements re-
70. Glen Coal Co. v. Seals, 147 F.3d 502, 513-14 (6th Cir. 1998). 
71. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 440 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
("Inaction, we have repeatedly stated, is a notoriously poor indication of congressional in­
tent. . . .  "); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600 (1983). 
72. 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1994). 
73. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57. The problems of compensating for injury 
and disease differ greatly. Indeed, the Act came about because the state workers' compensa­
tion programs that were designed to cover occupational injury neglected to fully cover occu­
pational disease. See supra text accompanying note 3. 
74. 33 U.S.C. § 920(c)-(d) (1994). 
75. See Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, supra note 55; Elinor P. Schroe­
der, Legislative and Judicial Responses to the Inadequacy of Compensation for Occupational 
Disease, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1986, at 151 (1986). 
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garding the failures of workers' compensation systems indicate that it 
did not intend the LHWCA provisions to work in a similar manner to 
the failed programs they sought to replace.76 At a minimum, congres­
sional intent is not obvious, as claimed by the Sixth Circuit.77 
An alternative intent likely could have motivated Congress's ac­
tions and the Act's express delegation of presumption-creating 
authority to the Department of Labor calls the Sixth Circuit's conclu­
sion into doubt. The LHWCA was one of the few areas where the fed­
eral government ran a program similar to the compensation system 
operated by the states.78 Congress could have envisioned the LHWCA 
and its attendant up and running administrative staff as one of the few 
examples of functioning programs at the federal level and sought to 
emulate its success. Finally, the delegation of presumption-making 
authority to the Department of Labor prohibits interpreting congres­
sional silence as a prohibition on presumptions in general.79 
B. Uniform Application of the Act 
This Section describes how the Doris Coal presumption results in a 
more uniform application of the Act. Miners claiming medical benefits 
under the Act start the process by filing a medical fee dispute claim 
with the District Director of the Office of Workers' 
Compensation Programs of the Department of Labor.80 A claims ex­
aminer at the Department of Labor makes an initial determination, 
which, if contested, continues to an informal conference and then on 
to a hearing in front of an Administrative Law Judge if requested by 
one of the parties.81 Appeals then continue to the Benefits Review 
Board, and then, if necessary, on to the Federal Courts of Appeals.82 
The Department of Labor includes the Doris Coal presumption in its 
Judge's Benchbook of the Black Lung Benefits Act, a resource that as-
76. See supra text accompanying notes 50-54. 
77. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
78. See Joan T. A. Gabel, Escalating Inefficiency in Workers' Compensation Systems: Is 
Federal Reform the Answer?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083, 1086-90 (1999) (discussing the 
origin of state workers' compensation systems and the limited nature of federal involve­
ment). 
79. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text; see also 30 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1994) 
("The Commissioner of Social Security shall by regulation prescribe standards for deter­
mining . . .  whether a miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis . . . .  "). 
80. Robert L. Ramsey & Robert S. Habermann, The Federal Black Lung Program -
The View from the Top, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 575, 584 (1985). 
81. Id. at 584-85. The claims examiner often requests an independent medical review of 
disputed treatment. 
82. Id. at 590-95. 
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sists judges adjudicating claims.83 The Benchbook states the general 
rule that "it is the claimant's burden to provide documentation," but 
then exempts the case of pulmonary care by referencing the Doris 
Coal decision.84 The Judge's Benchbook, however, recognizes the cir­
cuit split and, therefore, provides for different procedural burdens in 
the Sixth Circuit and all other Circuits. 
As the only appellate court decision regarding medical benefits 
disputes prior to Glen Coal, the Doris Coal decision established per­
suasive authority that the Department of Labor used in its administra­
tive materials as well as its proposed regulations.85 The Sixth 
Circuit abandoned this accepted approach in Glen Coal. It justified its 
express renunciation of the Doris Coal presumption on the grounds 
that any judicially crafted presumption would lead to inconsistent ap­
plication of the Act. 86 In actuality, however, the holding itself created 
an inconsistent application of the Act by forcing similarly situated 
miners in different jurisdictions to bear different burdens of produc­
tion. 87 The Sixth Circuit stated that judicial presumptions, in general, 
lead to inconsistent application of the Act, and, therefore, the court 
should not support the Doris Coal presumption regardless of the in­
consistent application created by their holding.88 If uniformity was a 
paramount goal, as claimed by the Sixth Circuit, then the measuring 
stick should have been the status quo, not some hypothetical world 
where other circuit's prior decisions do not receive great weight. 
Uniformly applying the Act best effectuates its remedial nature. 
Congress passed the Act in response to problems with miners receiv­
ing benefits everywhere, not just in isolated states. Because the De­
partment of Labor has yet to approve any state's black lung program, 
the Act applies with equal force everywhere. Inconsistent application 
of the Act undercuts the remedial protections it provides. 
83. Office of Administrative Law Judges, Department of Labor, Judge's Benchbook of 
the Black Lung Benefits Act (Jan. 1997), available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/ 
blalung/refrnclbbbcon.htm>. 
84. Id. at Ch. 19. 
85. See id.; Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966, 54,970 (proposed Oct. 8, 1999) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 
725.701(e)). 
86. Glen Coal Co. v. Seals, 147 F.3d 502, 513 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating "[i]f we were to 
[allow the presumption], then the door will be opened to the creation of other judicial pre­
sumptions in this Circuit and thereby destroy the desired uniformity of application of the 
Black Lung Benefits Act"). 
87. See 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966, 54,970 (stating "the Department believes that black lung 
benefit claims adjudication should vary as little as possible from circuit to circuit, and conse­
quently continues to propose a regulatory presumption, based on the Fourth Circuit's ap­
proach, that would apply nationwide"). 
88. Glen Coal, 147 F.3d at 513-14. 
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This Section asserts that the Doris Coal presumption results in a 
more efficient administration of the Act. This Section demonstrates 
that the Doris Coal presumption has a sound medical basis and thus 
helps decisionmakers reach accurate outcomes more quickly. Subsec­
tion C.1 shows that the Act's definition of pneumoconiosis is more ex­
pansive than the ordinary medical definition of pneumoconiosis. Sub­
section C.2 illustrates that in miners who have met stage one burdens 
of proving total disability due to pneumoconiosis, most pulmonary 
disorders relate to or are aggravated by their pneumoconiosis. Subsec­
tion C.3 contends that the Doris Coal presumption reduces error and 
administrative costs more than other alternative systems of dispute 
resolution. Subsection C.4 illustrates that the Doris Coal presumption 
does not affect the number of fraudulent claims, a concern voiced by 
the Sixth Circuit. 
1. The Act's Expansive Definition of Pneumoconiosis 
The Act's expansive definition of pneumoconiosis reinforces the 
Doris Coal presumption that pulmonary care relates to the miner's 
pneumoconiosis. Congress broadly defined the diseases compensable 
under the Act by including an extensive list of diseases in its definition 
of pneumoconiosis. Congress stated that the purpose of the Act is to 
provide benefits "to coal miners who are totally disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis and to the surviving dependents of miners whose 
death was due to such disease."89 The Act defines pneumoconiosis as 
"a chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, including respira­
tory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine employ­
ment. "90 A medical definition of coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP) 
refers to "a well-defined medical entity resulting from the deposition 
of coal mine dust in the lung and from the reaction to the deposited 
dust resulting in coal macules, coal nodules, and progressive massive 
fibrosis."9 1 CWP displays a characteristic pathological feature of coal 
dust laden macrophages (large cells that ingest foreign materials).9 2 As 
the amount of coal dust in the lung increases, CWP inhibits the lung's 
ability to exchange carbon dioxide and oxygen.93 Significant impair-
89. 30 U.S.C. § 901(a) (1994). 
90. 30 u.s.c. § 902(b). 
91. Attfield & Wagner, supra note 1, at 413. 
92. Jerome Kleinerman et al., Pathology Standards for Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis, 
103 ARCHIVES OF PATHOLOGY LABORATORY MED. 375, 376 (1979). 
93. Ronald G. Crystal, Interstitial Lung Disease, in CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 396, 
398 (James B. Wyngaarden ed., 1992). 
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ment of the lung by CWP does not occur until advanced stages of 
CWP, known as complicated CWP or progressive massive fibrosis.94 
The Act's definition does not reference medical definitions, spe­
cific symptoms, or indicators of pneumoconiosis. Courts recognize that 
the legal definition of pneumoconiosis is broader than the medical 
definition.95 Legal pneumoconiosis is distinct from clinical pneumoco­
niosis in two ways: (1) legal pneumoconiosis covers more diseases than 
clinical pneumoconiosis and (2) legal pneumoconiosis requires less 
proof to establish than clinical pneumoconiosis. Indeed, courts have 
specifically examined diseases other than pneumoconiosis with very 
different disease mechanisms and determined their fit under the legal 
definition of pneumoconiosis.96 The regulations reiterate the Act's 
broad definition of legal pneumoconiosis.97 
The methods of diagnosis permitted under the Department of La­
bor regulations support the inclusion of other diseases under the ru­
bric of legal pneumoconiosis. The current regulations outline four 
ways that miners can establish pneumoconiosis: (1) a chest X-ray; (2) a 
biopsy or autopsy; (3) a statutory presumption, if applicable; and (4) a 
physician exercising sound medical judgment.98 Clinical pneumoconio­
sis can only be diagnosed through an X-ray or biopsy, thus the recog­
nition that the diagnosis of a physician exercising sound medical 
judgment or even qualification via presumption allows for the diagno­
sis of a disease that qualifies as legal pneumoconiosis, even though it 
may not qualify as clinical pneumoconiosis.99 The regulations bolster 
94. CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 2338 (James B. Wyngaarden ed., 1992) ("Simple 
coal workers' pneumoconiosis most often consists of radiographic abnormalities without 
symptoms."). 
95. "Although 'coal workers' pneumoconiosis' may be used synonymously with pneu­
moconiosis in medical circles, the two terms are distinct legally. First, § 718.201 includes coal 
workers' pneumoconiosis as only one of several possible ailments which could satisfy the 
legal definition of pneumoconiosis. Furthermore, the comparative breadth of the legal defi­
nition contained in § 718.201 is indicated by its inclusion of certain disorders which medically 
are different from pneumoconiosis . . . .  Clearly, the legal definition contained in § 718.201 is 
significantly broader than the medical definition of coal workers' pneumoconiosis." Hobbs v. 
Clinchfield Coal Co., 45 F.3d 819, 821 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also Cornett v. 
Benham Coal, Inc., 227 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2000). 
96. Compare Littlepage v. Director, 890 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (holding 
that pulmonary fibrosis without other supporting medical evidence to establish a significant 
relationship to coal mine dust does not fall within the Act's definition of pneumoconiosis), 
with Warth v. Southern Ohio Coal Co., 60 F.3d 173, 175 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that Chronic 
Obstructive Lung Disease is encompassed within the definition of pneumoconiosis for the 
purposes of entitlement to black lung benefits). 
97. 20 C.F.R. § 718.201 (2000) (stating "[t]his definition includes, but is not limited to, 
coal workers' pneumoconiosis, anthracosilicosis, anthracosis, anthrosilicosis, massive pulmo­
nary fibrosis, progressive massive fibrosis, silicosis or silicotuberculosis"). 
98. 20 C.F.R. § 718.202 (2000). 
99. James L. Weeks & Gregory R. Wagner, Commentary: Compensation for Occupa­
tional Disease with Multiple Causes: The Case of Coal Miners' Respiratory Diseases, 76 AM. 
J. OF PUB. HEALTH 58, 58-59 (1986) (stating "CWP is diagnosed by the examination of lung 
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the conclusion that CWP is but one of many diseases that qualify as 
legal pneumoconiosis.100 A report reviewing the black lung benefits 
program by the General Accounting Office supports this distinction, 
stating that "in most cases, medical evidence was not adequate to es­
tablish a coal miner's disability or death from black lung," however, 
even where medical evidence was lacking, the award of benefits was 
"legal under existing legislation."101 The report expressly recognized 
the broad definition of pneumoconiosis under the Act and regulations. 
Courts differ on the required causal nexus between legal pneumo­
coniosis and the miner's disability. All base their analysis on the regu­
lations established by the Department of Labor, but come to divergent 
conclusions. Under the broadest standard, currently advocated by the 
Sixth Circuit, the miner must prove that her disability was caused "at 
least in part" by pneumoconiosis.102 Other circuits require that pneu­
moconiosis must be "at least a contributing cause" of the miner's dis­
ability to merit benefits.103 The Third and Eleventh Circuits require 
the most restrictive causal nexus between pneumoconiosis and the 
miner's disability, holding that the pneumoconiosis must be a "sub­
stantial contributing factor."104 
Under the "substantial contributing factor" test, a smaller subset of 
miners who suffer from pneumoconiosis and other pulmonary im­
pairments will receive benefits under stage one of the Act than under 
the broader "at least in part" or "contributing cause" test. Thus, if 
medical science supports the Doris Coal presumption for miners 
whose pneumoconiosis "at least in part" caused them to be totally dis­
abled, the presumption will draw even stronger support for miners 
whose pneumoconiosis is a "substantial contributing factor" in their 
disability. This Note, therefore, examines the relationship between 
tissue from biopsy or autopsy specimens or by the findings on a chest x-ray film" and that 
"[t)he key difference between the medical and Congressional definitions is that the Congres­
sional term does not imply exclusive reliance on a single diagnostic procedure"). 
100. See supra note 97. 
101. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LEGISLATION ALLOWS BLACK LUNG BENEFITS 
TO BE AWARDED WITHOUT ADEQUATE EVIDENCE OF DISABILITY iii (1980). 
102. Adams v. Director, 886 F.2d 818, 825 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that miner must show 
totally disabling respiratory impairment due at least in part to his pneumoconiosis and 
adopting the language in 20 C.F.R. § 718.203(a)). The Sixth Circuit later elaborated, stating 
that a miner must prove more than a de minimis or infinitesimal contribution by pneumoco­
niosis to his total disability. Peabody Coal Co. v. Smith, 127 F.3d 504, 507 (6th Cir. 1997). 
103. See Robinson v. Pickands Mather & Co., 914 F.2d 35, 38 (4th Cir. 1990); Shelton v. 
Director, 899 F.2d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 1990); Mangus v. Director, 882 F.2d 1527, 1531-32 (10th 
Cir. 1989). 
104. Lollar v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 893 F.2d 1258, 1265 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding 
black lung claimant must "establish that his pneumoconiosis was a substantial contributing 
factor in the causation of his total pulmonary disability"); Bonessa v. United States Steel 
Corp., 884 F.2d 726, 734 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that miner must show that pneumoconiosis 
is a "substantial contributor" to his disability). 
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medical science and the Doris Coal presumption in miners whose 
pneumoconiosis "at least in part" caused their total disability. 
2. Pulmonary Disorders Likely Have Sufficient 
Relationship to Pneumoconiosis 
Miners enter stage two of the application process when they seek 
coverage for medical benefits. 105 They will have already established 
that they are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis under one of the 
three standards identified above.106 The most controversy arises when 
miners who smoke or used to smoke attempt to claim benefits under 
the Act.107 Even in these difficult cases, medical science supports the 
Doris Coal presumption because most pulmonary care received by 
miners who have met the stage one burden of proving total disability 
will "relate to or be aggravated by" their pneumoconiosis. Thus, under 
the Doris Coal presumption, miners seeking coverage for pulmonary 
care do not have to carry the burden of production, significantly re­
ducing the procedural hurdles faced by the miner. 
Coal miners have elevated death rates due to numerous lung dis­
eases: CWP, emphysema, influenza, asthma, tuberculosis, chronic ob­
structive pulmonary disease, and chronic bronchitis.108 In addition to 
higher prevalence of respiratory diseases among the mining popula­
tion, studies causally link coal mining to specific diseases. Exposure to 
respirable coal dust can cause emphysema.109 Research also links the 
incidence of bronchitis directly with the amount of inhaled dust.110 
105. See supra note 17 (discussing stage one and stage two). 
106. Thus, the question becomes: with miners who are totally disabled due to pneumo­
coniosis (that is, miners whose pneumoconiosis is "at least in part" a factor in their total dis­
ability) are most pulmonary disorders related to or at least aggravated by their pneumoco­
niosis? 
107. See, e.g., Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 690 (1991) (discussing the 
proper regulations to apply to a miner who smoked for thirty-four years); Glen Coal Co. v. 
Seals, 147 F.3d 502, 507 (6th Cir. 1998) (denying benefits to miner who smoked for thirty­
five years). See generally, e.g. , W.K.C. Morgan, On Dust, Disability, and Death, 134 AM. 
REV. RESPIRATORY D ISEASE 639 (1986); Thomas M. Roy et al., Variability in the Evalua­
tion of the Federal Black Lung Benefits Claimant, 29 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 937 (1987); 
Weeks & Wagner, supra note 99. 
108. Attfield & Wagner, supra note 1, at 425; B.G. Miller & M. Jacobsen, Dust Expo­
sure, Pneumoconiosis, and Mortality of Coalminers, 42 BRIT. J. INDUS. MED. 723, 730 
(1985). 
109. See Leigh et al., Quantitative Relation Between Emphysema and Lung Mineral 
Content in Coalworkers, 51 OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL . MED. 400, 404 (1994); V. Anne 
Ruckley et al., Emphysema and Dust Exposure in a Group of Coal Workers, 129 AM. REV. 
RESPIRATORY DISEASE 528, 528 (1984) (concluding that "the association observed between 
exposure to respirable coal dust and emphysema in coal miners indicates a causal relation­
ship"); G. Worth, Editorial: Emphysema in Coal Workers, 6 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 401, 403 
(1984) (stating "very often the [coal] dust causes pulmonary emphysema"). 
110. S. Rae et al., Chronic Bronchitis and Dust Exposure in British Coalminers, in 
INHALED PARTICLES, Ill 883, 893 (W.H. Dalton ed., 1971). But see Leigh et al., supra note 
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Unlike CWP, however, miners with emphysema and bronchitis re­
sulting from coal mine dust exposure do not have distinctive lesions 
that identify the occupational cause.11 1  In addition, emphysema and 
bronchitis have other non-occupational causes such as smoking. 
Smoking does not affect the development of simple CWP.112 Dis­
putes remain, however, about how lungs react to tobacco smoke and 
coal dust. Some researchers find that no synergistic effect occurs be­
tween smoking and coal dust exposure,113 but others find that smoking 
is more of a factor than coal dust exposure in the development of pul­
monary impairment.114 Smoking can add additional impairment of 
lung function significantly in miners who have CWP so that they meet 
the "total disability" test described in the regulations.115 In other 
words, of two miners, a smoker and nonsmoker with identical devel­
opment of CWP, the smoker may qualify for benefits while the non­
smoker may not be sufficiently disabled to meet the total disability 
test. This bias is only reflected, however, when diagnosis occurs 
through the use of objective evidence other than the chest 'radiograph 
to diagnose CWP, since the chest x-ray allows accurate determination 
of the extent of CWP.1 16 The regulations allow miners whose diagnosis 
reflects both damage from coal dust and tobacco smoke to qualify for 
benefits, as they expressly state that a miner with a negative chest x­
ray may still receive benefits if a doctor using sound medical judgment 
declares the miner to have pneumoconiosis.11 7  
109 (noting that bronchitis observed at  autopsy is  not associated with years of  work at  the 
coal face). 
1 1 1. See Attfield & Wagner, supra note 1, at 413. 
1 12. See M. Jacobsen et al., Smoking and Coalworkers' Simple Pneumoconiosis, in 
INHALED PARTICLES IV 759, 759 (W.H. Walton ed., 1977) (concluding "the main variable 
determining the development of simple pneumoconiosis is exposure to airborne dust, and 
that this effect is not modified appreciably by whether or not coal miners smoke"). 
1 13. Michael D. Attfield & Thomas K. Hodous, Pulmonary Function of U.S. Coal Min­
ers Related to Dust Exposure Estimates, 145 AM. REV. OF RESPIRATORY DISEASE 605, 607-
08 (1992) (finding that the combined effect of smoking and dust exposure was not worse 
than the additive effect of each, as measured by pulmonary function). 
1 14. S. Rae found that for most age groups and overall the prevalence of symptoms of 
bronchitis is more than doubled in smokers compared with nonsmokers, suggesting that 
smoking is more likely than coal mining to contribute to bronchitis. Rae, supra note 1 10, at 
892. 
1 15. Another researcher demonstrated that cigarette smoking emerged as the primary 
variable associated with pulmonary impairment severe enough to warrant a financial award 
under present legislation. Thomas M. Roy et al., Cigarette Smoking and Federal Black Lung 
Benefits in Bituminous Coal Miners, 31 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 98, 98 (1989). 
1 16. Roscoe C. Young, Jr. & Raylinda E. Rachal, Pulmonary Disability in Former Ap­
palachian Coal Miners, 88 J. OF THE NAT'L MED. ASS'N 517, 518 (1996). See also Roy et al., 
supra note 1 15, at 98 (concluding "the present federal legislation intended to identify and 
remunerate those who suffer lung impairment from chronic occupational exposure to coal 
dust is biased in favor of those who sustain additional damage to their ventilatory capacity 
by smoking cigarettes"). 
1 17. 20 C.F.R. § 718.202 (2000). 
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Thus, even if both smoking and pneumoconiosis contribute to a 
miner's pulmonary disability, coverage for pulmonary care is appro­
priate. Complications from smoking and pneumoconiosis often inter­
act to create health problems that neither one would bring about on its 
own.118 Where the two elements (smoking and coal mining) work to­
gether to create greater medical problems, the Act and regulations 
mandate that such medical problems shall be covered.119 Not only do 
the regulations allow such a miner to prove disability, they sanction 
such an award by stating that the miner shall receive treatment for 
such conditions as her "pneumoconiosis and ancillary pulmonary con­
ditions and disability require[s]."120 Given the miner described above, 
the portion of the miner's disability related to smoking is an ancillary 
disability compensable under the Act. 
It is very hard for medical examination to determine which part of 
the disability comes from coal dust exposure or smoking in a particular 
miner.121 Thus, policymakers must attempt to extrapolate results of 
group studies of causation and effect down to the level of the individ­
ual.122 While such a practice is a crude tool fraught with error with re­
gard to the individual, the net error diminishes when such information 
is used in public policy decision-making. The Doris Coal presumption 
may not accurately reflect the medical condition or treatment of an 
individual miner, but by creating a presumption that is more likely 
than not to reflect the situation in the case at issue, it reduces net error 
in resolving miner's claims. Again, in the clearly false individual cases, 
the coal company can rebut the presumption by showing that the 
treatment at issue did not fall within the scope of coverage of the Act. 
3. Reduced Error and Administrative Costs 
The Doris Coal presumption shifts the burden of production to 
approximate actual probabilities. As shown above, eligible miners 
seeking medical care will, more likely than not, qualify for treatment 
under the Act. As such, the burden-shifting presumption better re­
flects the actual situation of a population as a whole and saves admin­
istrative costs. This population-level accuracy does not mean that 
those miners who seek coverage for ineligible medical benefits should 
118. See supra notes 1 12-115. 
1 19. 20 C.F.R. § 725.701(b) (2000). 
120. 20 C.F.R. § 725.70l(b) (2000) (emphasis added). 
121. Weeks & Wagner, supra note 99, at 59-60 (concluding that " [w]hen discussing 
compensation policy, the problem with considering these other conditions caused by or ag­
gravated by exposure to coal mine dust is that causes can be assessed qualitatively but can­
not be precisely apportioned in an individual"). 
122 See SIR AUSTIN BRADFORD HILL, A SHORT TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL STATISTICS 
288-96 (1976). 
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automatically receive coverage in the name of administrative effi­
ciency. Rather, the rebuttable nature of the presumption encourages 
the coal company or the government to produce information demon­
strating the ineligibility of the medical services.1 23 
By switching the burden of production, the Doris Coal presump­
tion best fulfills the remedial nature of the Act while placing proper 
incentives on parties to produce relevant information. In a system with 
a bimodal choice of outcomes - coverage for the disputed medical 
treatment or no coverage - an allocation system that initially appor­
tions liability based on the best guess as determined by medical prob­
ability will result in the most correct outcomes.124 Imagine the situation 
in which a miner's pulmonary impairment arises either from complica­
tions from smoking or pneumoconiosis. There, traditional preponder­
ance of the evidence analysis tells us that if the miner can establish 
with more than a 0.5 probability that the condition is due to pneumo­
coniosis, she should receive full coverage. Alternatively, if the miner 
can establish only a 0.4 probability, then she should not receive cover­
age. In such a situation, where the probability is greater than 0.5, a 
presumption of coverage most effectively approximates the likely out­
come and reduces costs to the miner and administrative system. A sys­
tem that consistently created inaccurate results would not have high 
administrative costs if practical or legal obstacles prevented parties 
from correcting those mistakes. Such a system, however, would not 
fulfill the requirements of the enabling statute. In a system that values 
correct outcomes, a process that creates the most number of accurate 
results at first will have lower administrative costs than one that re­
quires extensive administrative procedures to correct erroneous initial 
determinations. 
The Act and regulations mandate coverage both for conditions 
caused by pneumoconiosis and for ancillary conditions, effectively in­
cluding the situation arising when both smoking and pneumoconiosis 
contribute the pulmonary impairment.1 25 As the Sixth Circuit de­
scribed in Glen Coal, "this definition could be met by simple synergy 
(i.e., another pulmonary disease that combines with pneumoconiosis 
to cause a sum of disease greater than the two parts), or by relatedness 
(i.e., another pulmonary disease that would be either absent or signifi-
123. The responsible party receives information about the requested treatment when 
the miner requests coverage. If the responsible party seeks to contest eligibility, normal dis­
covery procedures allow them full access to the miner's medical file. For a typical discussion 
of how responsible parties can rebut the Doris Coal presumption, see Glen Coal Co. v. Seals, 
147 F.3d 502, 508 (6th Cir. 1998) (reversing opinion of Administrative Law Judge that ap­
plied the Doris Coal presumption). 
124. For a general discussion of the comparative accuracy rates of the preponderance of 
evidence rule, see Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring 
Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 691, 703-04 (1990). 
125. 20 C.F.R. § 725.701(b) (2000). 
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cantly less virulent but for the pneumoconiosis)."126 Frequently, 
smoking and coal dust exposure interact to cause synergistic or related 
diseases, thus meeting the required causal nexus. 
4. Fraud 
The Sixth Circuit stated that the Doris Coal presumption would 
free doctors of the requirement of showing the "relation between the 
treatment and the pneumoconiosis" and thus greatly increase the op­
portunity for fraud.1 27 The court dismissed the employer's ability to 
rebut the presumption by saying that the "employer is not in as good a 
position to obtain such evidence as is the treating doctor. "1 28 The doc­
tor, the argument goes, would not have anyone looking over her 
shoulder to ensure that she doesn't receive payment for noneligible 
(or nonexistent) care. The court based this argument on erroneous as­
sumptions about incentives and opportunities facing doctors. 
Under the Doris Coal presumption, claimants still only receive 
coverage for eligible medical benefits, and the opportunity for fraud 
does not increase. The miners just receive a presumption that pulmo­
nary care sufficiently relates to their pneumoconiosis.1 29 The presump­
tion does not change the underlying burden of persuasion, but merely 
reallocates the burden of production. Employers remain free to rebut 
the miner's evidence through a variety of means and the miner must 
ultimately convince the factfinder that the care met the eligibility re­
quirements. Regardless of the Doris Coal presumption, the burden of 
production is never on the doctor, nor is she a party to the claim. 
By claiming that the employer is not in as good a position to obtain 
evidence as the treating doctor, the Sixth Circuit, by implication, 
claims that the doctor is in the best position to produce information 
about the miner's treatment. This doctor-as-best-problem-solver ar­
gument, however, fails to recognize that the claimant'.s doctor plays 
the same role regardless of the presumption. Under both regimes, the 
doctor can fraudulently prepare medical bills for unrelated treatment. 
The best-problem-solver argument loses its charm when it is precisely 
the fraudulent behavior of the best problem solver that the court seeks 
to monitor. In addition, other mechanisms for the reduction of fraud 
in the black lung benefits program better serve to police behavior.1 30 
126. Glen Coal, 147 F.3d at 514. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Examples of other mechanisms include greater administrative monitoring, more 
severe sanctions for violations, and expanded incentives for miners and medical providers to 
report fraud. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Doris Coal court injected a common-sense presumption into 
the adjudication process for already-eligible miners seeking coverage 
for medical care. This change is consistent with the Act, current stric­
tures covering the relationship between agencies and courts, and the 
agency's existing presumptions. The burden-shifting presumption also 
increases the accuracy and efficiency of the black lung benefits pro­
gram while maintaining an opportunity for coal companies to contest 
payments for ineligible care. Universal adoption of the Doris Coal 
presumption will help to reduce the role of geography in providing 
medical coverage for eligible miners and ensure that the black lung 
benefits system is administered in a more fair and equitable manner. 
